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SYMMETRY IN FREE MARKETS 
B. P. FABRICAND~" 
Pratt Institute, Brooklyn, NY 11205, U.S.A. 
Abstract--Free markets are shown to be highly symmetric under an interchange operation involving 
market participants. The symmetry operation leads to a conservation law of information: there xists no 
information that permits one person to have a greater expectation than any other. Symmetry violations 
arising from privileged and late-breaking information may occur and lead to better-than-average per- 
formance. The role of government i  symmetric markets i briefly explored. 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of symmetry has been crucial to the development of modern physics. For casting 
symmetry in such a pivotal role, we are indebted to Albert Einstein and his 1905 paper introducing 
special relativity [1]. 
Before then, the connection between symmetry and the laws of physics was recognized (if it was 
recognized at all) only peripherally. The main interest was in the conservation laws. I f  a system 
under observation remains unchanged under some symmetry operation--technically, if the system 
Hamiltonian stays constant--then some observable describing the system remains unchanged. That 
observable is then said to be invariant or conserved. Thus, a system unaffected by a spatial trans- 
lation conserves momentum. A system unaffected by a temporal translation conserves energy. A 
system unaffected by a spatial rotation conserves angular momentum. A system unaffected by an 
interchange of neutrons for protons or protons for neutrons conserves i otopic spin. These are just 
some of the great conservation laws that prove so useful in predicting the future behavior of 
real-world systems. 
Einstein deepened the idea of symmetry. He introduced the daringly speculative postulate that 
the basic laws of physics themselves be symmetric under what is known as a Lorentz transformation 
- - they must remain invariant under a rotation in four-dimensional space-time. In other words, two 
observers moving with constant velocity relative to each other must experience the same laws of 
physics even though their temporal and spatial measurements on some commonly observed event 
will differ. Time and space are no longer absolute constructs but depend on the observer. Einstein's 
hypothesis proved so successful that Lorentz invariance is now the sine qua non of all modern 
theories. 
Whether or not symmetry will occupy so pivotal a role in the social sciences is not known at 
present. Some limited applications with far-reaching implications can be and are made in this article 
to free markets. These furnish particularly suitable systems for study. Not only are they of 
significance to all societies, but they are readily handled with probability theory and statistics, at 
least in their more tractable forms. Risk and reward, which accompany all human activity (or the 
lack of it), and the expectation of each market participant are the observables of interest. Because 
their calculation can become normously complicated, we shall begin our analysis with some simple 
games of chance, what we may term money markets. In such markets, the participants risk money 
to make more money. This approach offers several advantages: (1) the risks are easily calculated; 
(2) the rewards are well-known and uncomplicated by considerations of value received for goods 
and services; (3) all possible future outcomeg can be foreseen and (4) they are realized in a short 
time. Some or all of these benefits must be given up as our study broadens to include the more 
complex public markets in which we as civilized human beings participate. The pari-mutuel market, 
the stock market and the market-organized society will undergo examination as to the nature and 
consequences of their symmetries. Finally, the problems faced by both individuals and governments 
in enhancing free market expectations are briefly explored. 
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A GAME OF ROULETTE 
As a first application of symmetry to free markets, we consider the casino game of roulette. The 
mechanical details should be well-known. A small white ball is dropped onto a slotted, rotating 
wheel. After rolling around the rim of the wheel several times, the ball loses momentum and drops 
into a numbered slot that may be colored black, red or green. In American roulette, there are 18 
red slots, 18 black slots, and 2 green slots labeled "0" and "00". The roulette player seeking to 
augment his wealth must predict where the ball will fall. For him, the present leads to not one but 
many possible futures, each with its own probability of occurrence. In this sense, games of chance 
make good models of real-world happenings and are widely used as such in scientific theories. The 
enormous popularity of gambling may stem from this correspondence. 
Suppose our gambler decides to bet on one of the 18 red numbers. If the wheel is unbiased, the 
ball is equally likely to land on any of the 38 numbers. Out of these 38 possible outcomes, there 
are 18 ways of winning and 20 ways of losing. We say that the player has 18 chances in 38 of winning, 
or a win probability of 18/38. In other words, he can expect o win on average 18 times for every 
38 spins of the wheel. This then is his risk. The reward for winning, the player's profit, is set by the 
casino operator at $1 for every $1 bet. The reward for losing is, of course, loss of the stake. 
In any given game, a gambler isking $1 on such a bet may win $1 or lose $1. However, he is 
more likely to lose than win. The question to be asked is this: over many games, how much will 
our gambler win or lose for each dollar bet? The answer is called his "expectation" and it may be 
found as follows: on average, a bet on a red number wins 18 times in every 38 games. In 20 games, 
the stake is lost. For $1 bets, he wins $18 and losses $20 over 38 games, on average. His net return 
is a loss of $2 for every $38 bet. The expectation is just the net return divided by the total amount 
bet, or -$2/38. The minus sign indicates a loss or negative xpectation; a plus sign would indicate 
a profit or positive xpectation. In pennies, the expectation is - 5.3z. We must understand that this 
is an average, a result o be expected over a large number of games for an unbiased wheel. Whenever 
he plays roulette, a person can expect o lose 5.3e' per dollar bet. But there may be winning streaks 
producing a profit and losing streaks producing reater-than-expected losses. Some players may 
even break the bank on very rare occasions. Appendix A exhibits a general formula from probability 
theory for calculating the expectation. 
When the expectation for all players is the same, the returns per dollar bet are normally 
distributed and centered at the expectation, as in Fig. 1. That means that more people realize a 
return per dollar bet of - 5.3~ than any other return. As we move to the right or left along the curve, 
fewer people realize greater or lesser eturns. Note the symmetry of the bell-shaped curve. As many 
roulette players appear in the right wing of the curve as the left wing. 
THE ROULETTE MARKET 
The roulette market, like all others, involves transactions between people. There must be both 
a buyer and a seller. The roulette player buys the chance to make more money. The casino operator 
sells him that chance. The casino's expectation is + 5.3z, the exact opposite of the players. That 
means that the casino hopes to generate revenues of 5.3z for every dollar bet by the players. From 
this money, the operator must cover the costs of running the marketplace (the casino), the interest 
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Fig. 1. Distribution of returns from red-black bets in roulette. 
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return on his investment (his cost of capital). We shall discuss the seller's overall expectation i the 
section on consumer markets. 
From the buyer's perspective, the roulette market is an excellent example of a free market. 
Everybody is welcome to play regardless of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or political 
belief. Nobody is excluded. The rules of play are established and enforced by the casino, and they 
are the same for all. Every player can act as he wishes within the terms set forth in the rules of play. 
The casino neither influences the outcomes nor interferes with the players' betting methods. Neither 
does it make any attempt o confiscate, renege on or redistribute the players' winnings. Finally, all 
players have equal access to any and all information that may aid them in attaining their goals. 
Except where governments limit competition, the casino operator also conducts his business in 
a free market. He must compete with all other casinos in attracting customers. To do this, he 
provides suitable ambience, offers quality entertainment and serves good food and drink at 
reasonable cost. Most importantly, he fixes the players' expectation at a level that permits 
reasonable profits for the casino and at the same time rewards attractive nough to entice people 
to the roulette table. Competitive conditions in the American roulette market have produced an 
equilibrium expectation for the player of - 5.3g. At this figure, both buyer and seller seem to derive 
a maximum of satisfaction from their market transactions. The casino operates on a reasonable 
profit margin and the players pay a fair price for the delights offered. Such a market has been called 
°'efficient" [2]. We shall see that it is also symmetric. In such markets, all participants know all there 
is to know in setting the terms of transactions. 
SYMMETRY IN THE ROULETTE MARKET 
Regarding the roulette market as our system under observation, we can now ask if there are 
symmetry operations that leave it unchanged. And, if so, what is conserved? We shall dispense with 
the obvious symmetry that the laws of physics, which govern the behavior of all people and roulette 
apparatuses, are the same wherever and whenever the game is played. Of significance to us is the 
constancy of the roulette market when any person whosoever is interchanged with any other person. 
No matter who is playing and no matter who the substitution is, the probabilities, rewards and 
expectation are exactly the same. A person placing his bets at random can expect o do as well as 
anybody else. As far as the roulette market is concerned, one person looks just like any other. It 
makes no difference whether the roulette gambler is an Einstein or a village idiot, a king or a beggar. 
We can say that the roulette market is symmetric under the operation of player interchange. 
The conserved quantity is information. There exists no valid information from any source that 
enables one person to do better than another at roulette. Betting systems, mathematical knowledge, 
intuition, intellect, clairvoyance, crystal balls, astrology, witchcraft--the painful losses endured by 
all serious roulette gamblers offer mute testimony that none of these can change the expectation one 
iota. Everything known about roulette is built into the game. We have here a market of equal 
opportunity; every player has the same expectation. That is not to say there is equality of reward. 
Over a number of games, the people sitting around the roulette table realize very different profits 
and losses, as indicated in Fig. 1. Some will do average, some better and some worse. Furthermore, 
there is no predicting beforehand who will do what. A player's past record gives no hint of his future 
performance. 
Achieving better-than-average performance on a consistent basis in the roulette market is 
equivalent to violating interchange symmetry. To accomplish this, a player must acquire valid 
information ot generally known to either the other players or the casino operators and exploit it. 
From what has been said so far, such information may seem impossible to get. But, maybe not. 
Reality is much more complex than the rather simple considerations discussed above might lead us 
to believe, and we must delve more deeply into the validity of interchange symmetry. 
In our roulette model, we assumed the existence of an unbiased wheel and took 18/38 as the 
"true" probability of the ball falling into a red slot. When plugged into the theory of probability, 
this number yields a negative xpectation. Suppose, however, that the actual probabilities for each 
slot are not known, as they are not for a real rotating roulette wheel in a casino. All mechanical 
devices are to some degree imperfectly constructed, and it is very likely that the wheel is somewhat 
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biased and the probabilities for the 38 slots are not all equal. If this be the case, no amount of logic 
and mathematics in themselves can describe the behavior of this real-world object. Probability 
theory can say something about the future only when the right probabilities are fed in. Failing this, 
a positive expectation i roulette becomes a possibility. 
We may divide roulette aficionados into two groups. People in the first group are proponents of 
the biased wheel model of roulette. They insist that the deviations from equal probabilities are great 
enough to produce a positive xpectation. To see the effect of a wheel imbalance, suppose the casino 
operator is unaware that the probability of "red" is 20/38 instead of 18/38. The expectation of a 
bet on "red" would then be + 5.3z rather than - 5.3g. A player knowing this could reap an average 
profit of 5.3z for every dollar bet on red. 
People in the second group are proponents of the unbiased wheel model. Included in this group 
are the casino operators. The latter, from their knowledge of the roulette mechanism, have risked 
their money on equal probability for all slots. They claim that any deviations of the unknown prob- 
abilities from equality are too small to measure. Therefore, nobody possesses or can possess any 
information that allows symmetry violation and its consequence, better-than-average performance 
on a consistent basis. 
Now the argument isjoined on the proper grounds. We have a one-on-one confrontation between 
two groups of participants in the roulette market. Whose conception of reality is more correct? Is 
the market symmetric? Suffice it to say here that casinos have been offering roulette to all comers 
for hundreds of years without going bankrupt. They have not bothered to modify the rules of play 
or the payoffs, and they have not excluded potential customers. The market has shown not the 
slightest sign of disruption from a symmetry violation. Still, an argument such as this can be resolved 
only by careful observation and measurement by competent and reliable people. There is no 
recourse in the marketplace to "true" probabilities or "higher" authority. 
Interchange symmetry and its related conservation of information, it should be clear, arise solely 
in free markets. Controlled markets, by contrast, have by definition one or more of the following 
features: arbitrary exclusion of players, censorship of information, interference with playing 
methods, or tampering with earnings, any one of which destroys ymmetry through its effect on the 
expectation. The converse is not the case. Free markets may also exhibit symmetry violations 
allowing some people to do consistently better than average. 
A SYMMETRY VIOLATION IN THE BLACKJACK MARKET 
Blackjack or "2 l" is one of the most popular of all gambling ames and one of the most lucrative 
for the casinos. We need not go into the details except o say that like all such games, it held out 
a negative monetary expectation to the player until the early 1960's when a symmetry violation 
severely disrupted the blackjack market. The cause was newly discovered information in the form 
of a profitable system of blackjack play devised by mathematician Edward O. Thorp [3]. Thorp had 
uncovered a market inefficiency, a faulty assignment of probabilities to the future outcomes in 
blackjack. The model used by the casinos to calculate those probabilities assumed a constant deck 
of 52 cards and made no allowance for the diminution of the deck as the game progressed. With 
probabilities calculated for a diminishing deck, Thorp was able to establish a profitable method of 
play, one that yielded a positive expectation. 
Armed with his newfound knowledge, Thorp proceeded to put his theories to the test. Card 
dealers, who at first scoffed at the lucky newcomer, became by degrees increasingly bewildered and 
frustrated. The consternation fcasino operators mounted as funds drained from their coffers, until, 
finally, Thorp was barred from playing. Disguises and changes of venue no longer sufficed once 
dealers caught on to the style of play. The respite was short-lived. With the publication of Thorp's 
book, hordes of expert blackjack players descended on the gambling palaces eeking quick fortunes. 
Was there any way out of the quandary? By now the casino experts understood that Thorp's strategy 
had exploited a deficiency in their knowledge of blackjack, and they frantically sought a remedy. 
Their very existence jeopardized, the casinos changed the rules of play to ensure a negative 
expectation for the players based on the new probabilities. But one problem led to another. Under 
the altered rules, play at the blackjack tables fell off sharply, obliging a return to the old ones. 
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Multiple decks of cards from a shoe were next introduced, making it harder for players to "case" 
the deck, a prerequisite for profitable operations. More frequent shuffling made the Thorp system 
more difficult to apply, although it slowed the game down considerably. Winning players were 
vigorously excluded or taken care of by nimble-fingered dealers. Needless to say, this modern day 
gold rush was effectively detoured. Now, matters have come full cycle. The original rules are still 
in force and blackjack is again played in many places with one deck dealt and shuffled by hand. 
Adjustment o the new market conditions has been completed and equilibrium prevails. Casino 
profits are increasing, blackjack is more popular than ever, yet Thorp's system remains as valid now 
as then. When is good information ot good information? When the market is not free! 
New information has the potential for severely disrupting a free market. It may be an invention, 
a technical advance, a superior product and even a revolutionary theory such as Newton's System 
of the World. It may burst on the scene like an earthquake and it may sneak in so surreptitiously 
that not many people appreciate its significance and act on it. How a free market adapts to it 
depends on its structure. In free consumer markets, we shall see that such symmetry violations result 
not only in benefits to the innovator but in greater expectations for all. 
THE PARI MUTUEL MARKET 
We turn to a much more complex market, one in which the public as a whole must calculate the 
probabilities of future outcomes and their associated rewards. That the pari mutuel market is an 
almost ideal laboratory for the study of market mechanisms under institutional conditions has been 
largely ignored until recently. Yet, here we have a microcosm of society struggling to combat as best 
it can its own unique set of problems and uncertainties. Here are thousands of diverse individuals 
with easy access to enormous amounts of data trying to see what the future holds in store. Their 
problem is everybody's: to determine the probabilities and rewards of the possible future outcomes 
of an event, in this instance a sporting event. How each fares depends on the symmetry of the 
market. If interchange symmetry applies, there is conservation of information and all participants 
have the same expectation. If not, those with access to relevant information of limited availability 
can expect o de better than average. 
The popular sport of horse racing serves to illustrate the operation of the pari mutuel market. 
A person wishing to bet on a horse (we consider only bets to win) buys a ticket from the race track 
qqhi~h~ider/tifies the horse" chosen, the amount bet, the date and the number of the race. The race 
track collects all the money wagered to win by all bettors into a win pool, from which it deducts 
a certain amount known as the "take". Part of the take goes to the track for operating costs and 
part to the government as a tax. When the race is over, the track redeems the winning tickets with 
the money remaining in the pool, usually 80-85% of the original. 
Like the casino, the race track plays a passive role in the wagering. It establishes and enforces 
ihe rules of play, but neither influences the outcomes of the races nor interferes with the,players' 
betting methods. However, a major difference between the two arises in their handling of the 
bvin probabilities and rewards. In the roulette market, the casino operator must estimate the win 
probabilities and set the rewards o as to ensure a negative xpectation for the roulette player and 
a positive expectation for himself. The pari mutuel market operator, on the other hand, takes no 
.interest in the win probabilities. And he affects the players' rewards only indirectly through the size 
of the take. He does not in any way compete with the player for the money remaining in the pool 
'after removal of the take. 
Who then fixes the expectation of each horse bettor? Against whom does he compete for the 
money at stake? Remarkably, his competition is none other than all his fellow racegoers taken as 
a body. Their collective opinion of the winning probabilities of each horse and the take determine 
the expectation of the individual gambler. This relationship is shown in the following formula, 
which is derived in Appendix B: 
E, = P'(1 - - f ) - -  1, 
Pi 
Ei is the expectation of a player betting on one of the horses i in the race. Pi is the true (and unknown) 
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Table I. Probabilities and returns in the par± mutuel market (1955-1962) 
Public's True Number of Expected number Return 
probability probability horses and of winners dollar bet 
Dollar odds (%) (%) winners ± 2 s.d.'s (z) 
0.40-0.55 56.9 71.3 129--92 73 ± 11 +3.4 
0.60--0.75 50.2 55.3 295--163 148 ± 18 -7.1 
0.80-0.95 44.9 51.3 470--241 211 ± 22 -3.8 
1.00-1.15 40.6 47.0 615--289 250 ± 25 -2 .4  
1.20-1.35 37.1 40.3 789--318 293±27 -8.1 
1.40-1.55 34.1 37.9 874---331 298 ± 28 -6.1 
1.60-1.75 31.5 35.5 954--339 301 ± 29 -4.8 
1.80-1.95 29.3 30.9 1051--325 308 ± 30 - 10.5 
2.00-2.45 26.3 28.9 3223--933 848 ± 50 -6.5 
2.50-2.95 22.8 23.0 3623--835 826±50 -13.5 
3.00-3.45 20.1 20.9 3807--797 765 ± 50 -11.0 
3.50-3.95 18.0 18.6 3652~79 657 ±46 - 11.6 
4.00-4.45 16.2 16.1 3296--532 534 ± 42 -15.3 
4.50-4.95 14.8 15.5 3129--486 463 ±40 - 10.6 
5.00-5.95 13.2 12.3 5586---686 737 ± 50 -20.1 
6.00~.95 11.4 11.0 5154--565 588 ± 46 - 18.0 
7.00-7.95 10.0 9.9 4665--460 467 ± 41 - 16.4 
8.00-8.95 9.0 8.2 3990--328 359 ± 38 - 21.8 
9.00-9.95 8.1 8.2 3617--295 293 ± 33 - 14.7 
10.00-14.95 6.5 6.0 12,007--717 780 ± 54 -20.7 
15.00-19.95 4.7 4.0 7041--284 331 ± 35 -26.4 
20.00-99.95 2.5 1.4 25,0~4 340 626 ± 50 -54.0 
93,011--10,035t 
"t'The number of winners exceeds 10,000 because of dead heats. 
winning probability of horse i, and p~ is the winning probability of horse i as estimated by the betting 
public as a whole, f Is the fraction of the win pool removed as the take. 
It is easily seen that the higher the take the less the expectation of the gambler, no matter which 
horse he bets on. It is the same for all. For purposes of symmetry analysis, however, the probability 
ratio Pi/Pi is critical. If, for example, the public's estimate of the win probability p~ equals the true 
probability P~ for all horses, then E~ = - f .  That is, all bettors have exactly the same expectation 
independent of the choice of horse. Just as in the roulette market, one person would be "par± 
mutuelly" indistinguishable from any other person. Symmetry holds and information isconserved. 
An abundance of data from the past 40 years of horse racing permits us to test the validity of 
substitution symmetry. One of the first and most complete compilations i  reproduced in Table 1 
[4]. It shows the results of 10,000 races run at American thoroughbred tracks from 1955 to 1962. 
The 93,011 horses in these 10,000 races are grouped according to the "dollar odds," which denote 
a bettor's profit for every dollar risked should his horse win. The odds are related to the horse's 
win probability as estimated by the betting public (see Appendix B). The lower the odds, the greater 
the public's win probability for the horse. The horse starting at the lowest odds has the greatest win 
probability and is known as the "favorite". High-odds horses have small win probabilities and are 
known as longshots. 
The "true probability" for each group is taken equal to the win percentage, which is found by 
dividing the number of winners by the total number of horses (column 4). For all groups, the win 
percentage is an adequate statistical representation f the "true probability" for our purposes. 
Column 5 indicates the expected number of winners for the group when the public's probabilities 
are assumed correct and the anticipated range of statistical f uctuation (two standard eviations). 
Finally, the last column presents a bettor's return for each group, the amount won or lost per dollar 
bet if one dollar were staked on each horse. 
It should be noted that the dollar odds fluctuate during the betting period before the race 
according to the money wagered on each horse. The race track displays this information on the 
totalizator board or "tote," usually after each minute of betting. In Table 1, the final odds at the 
close of betting are used. These odds determine the rewards. 
SYMMETRY IN THE PAR!  MUTUEL  MARKET 
Table 1 reveals a remarkably close correlation between the public's estimates of the win prob- 
abilities and the true probabilities for most of the odds groups. Indeed, these two probabilities are 
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equal within statistical f uctuations for all horses tarting at dollar odds between $2.50 and $9.95. 
Discrepancies do arise, however, for horse starting at odds outside this range. The public under- 
estimates the win probabilities at low (short) odds and overestimates them at high (long) odds. 
Returns vary from a profit of 3z per dollar bet for the shortest odds horses (there are very few of 
these) to a loss of over 50z per dollar bet for the longer odds horses. An expectation of - 16z over 
the entire odds range would have obtained had the public's win probabilities been correct. 
The data point to a pari mutuel market hat is quasi-symmetric under the interchange operation. 
For all groups other than favorites and longshots, interchange symmetry holds. All bettors on horses 
in these groups have the same expectation--their returns are indistinguishable (within expected 
fluctuations) as far as the pari mutuel market is concerned. A person betting at random does as well 
as anybody else. There are departures from perfect symmetry for favorites and longshots which 
allow better-than-average performance for favorite players and worse-than-average performance by 
longshot players. The market hus distinguishes the latter two groups from all others. 
Such a violation of interchange symmetry implies the existence of valid information not generally 
known to the betting public. It is, therefore, not adequately factored into the wagering on favorites 
and longshots. Because of its limited availability, the public underbets the favorites and overbets 
the longshots. Favorite bettors know something the rest of the public does not. And those people 
betting on the horse favored by the public near the close of betting are able to utilize this information 
to realize better-than-average returns. They will not win, but they will lose less than expected. 
What is the nature of this information? How does it arise? We can understand this symmetry 
violation by examining the forecasts of those expert public handicappers a published in the racing 
journals, notably the Daily Racing Form in America. These brave gentlemen make their selections 
the day before the races take place. They have access to the past performances of the horses, the 
conditions of the next day's races, and any other information such as workouts available up to their 
deadlines. We shall refer to such information as "historical" data, in contrast to "late-breaking" 
information that becomes available afterwards. Late-breaking information may include the trainers' 
assessments of how their horses feel the morning of the race, unpublicized workouts, jockey changes, 
weight changes and the track condition. The experts must base their selections on historical data. 
How do they do? Table 2 contrasts their returns per dollar bet with that of the post favorites, 
the horses having the most money bet on them at the close of betting for four different 5000-race 
samples. The take at the time averaged to 16%, and it is clear that the experts' returns per dollar 
bet fluctuate narrowly about this figure. Their average is also 16%. This is just what we expect if 
the public determines winning probabilities accurately. We can conclude, therefore, that on the basis 
of historical data, interchange symmetry exists in the pari mutuel market. There is no historical 
information available that allows one person to do better than any other in the pari mutuel market. 
Now look at the post favorites. Although not profitable, the returns from bets on the crowd's 
choices are consistently better than those of the experts. By simply betting on these horses, aperson 
will do better than average. His expectation is greater than that of other bettors. In light of this 
finding, we are forced to admit he existence of information that violates market symmetry, that is, 
late-breaking ews. This information isnot known to the general public when they set the winning 
probabilities of the horses, and it leads to a skewness in the returns. These are not normally 
distributed as would be the case if everybody had the same expectation. More people realize 
better-than-average returns than less-than-average returns (because favorite players are most 
numerous), and the normal curve is skewed toward higher eturns. 
The pari mutuel market serves as a powerful first example of how a free group of people 
wholeheartedly acting in their own selfish interests utilize historical information i the best possible 
Tab le  2. Exper ts '  return per do l lar  bet in four  5000-race samples 
Publ ic  favor i tes - 10.8 -6 .6  -9 .2  -7 .5  
Re igh  count  - 16.5 - 16.0 - 14.6 - 12. I 
A rmst rong  - 14.3 - 14.9 - 12.9 - 14.7 
Sharpshooter  - 18.6 - 17.6 - 14.7 - 13.2 
Hermis  - -15 .0  -15 .5  - -18 .7  - -14.8  
Hand icap  -15 .4  -18 .2  -20 .9  - -17.3  
Sweep -15 .9  -18 .5  -19 .0  - -16 .4  
Trackman - 16.4 - 15.7 - 18.0 -- 12.8 
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way to make the best possible predictions of future happenings. It is an open arena where the 
thousands of diverse opinions of thousands of diverse individuals clash, interact and modify one 
another in such a way that the final consensus i a closer approximation to the truth than that of 
any single person. Not only does the public determine winning probabilities accurately, but it does 
so in a manner whereby the horses voted most likely to succeed o best. A remarkable performance! 
For scientific readers, late-breaking information removes a degeneracy in the pari mutuel market. 
Instead of one expectation for all bettors on the basis of historical information, there is a spectrum 
of expectations, the greatest being for favorite players and the smallest for longshot players. 
THE STOCK MARKET 
The invention of money introduced a flexible medium of exchange that made feasible the deferred 
transfer of goods and services. In effect, money became a call on the future output of producers. 
And it became also a convenient method of storage, an effective means for saving. When advancing 
technology rendered practicable projects of a scope beyond the means and abilities of a lone 
entrepreneur, it was but a step to pooling the monetary savings of individuals and channeling them 
into commercial and industrial ventures beyond the means of any one person. Venice, Genoa and 
the other Italian city-states made wondrous use of this device. Their merchants and craftmen 
together with other small savers built tall ships, stocked them with expensive cargoes of Italian 
manufacture, and sent astute captains abroad to trade their goods for foreign merchandize and gold 
on a favorable basis. So prosperous did the city-states become that they were able to initiate and 
finance the great cultural flowering of the Renaissance. Northern Europe saw a similar development 
in the cities of the Hanseatic league. 
The savings pool evolved in time into a modern capital market. Shares denoting fractional 
ownership of industrial and commercial organizations engaged in new and innovative ventures were 
parceled out to people willing to risk their present savings for possible future rewards. Investors 
received, in other words, a piece of the action proportional to their investment. Soon, those shares 
became transferable from one person to another, and stock markets sprung up to facilitate the 
exchange and allocate funds to new and old businesses. We have here the rudiments of the modern 
corporation with shares of common stock designating multiple ownership of the business. The 
Muscovy Company (chartered in 1555) and the Dutch East India Company (chartered in 1602) are 
two early examples of the genre. 
The stock market's importance in a capitalist society can hardly be overemphasized. It is the 
preferred channel for directing flows of individual savings into the creation and expansion of the 
means of production. It functions as a ready market in which corporations, both established and 
start-up, may raise money by selling stock to new fractional owners. How much money a company 
can raise depends on its prospects, as judged by the investing public. Innovative and efficient 
businesses find little difficulty in tapping the savings pool to finance their expansion plans and the 
development of new products and services. Inefficient, slothful companies, on the other hand, that 
produce obsolescent and inferior goods find it difficult o sell stock. In this manner, the stock market 
allocates the public's savings to businesses in accordance with the public's wishes. The great 
advantage to a company is that it gets the money free and clear of debt restrictions. 
The stock market offers to the individual investor a savings alternative. A person buying the stock 
of some company thinks that the return on his money, from price appreciation and dividends (cash 
payments out of profits made to stockholders), may be greater than the return available lsewhere. 
A person selling a stock thinks he can do better either in another stock or in some other investment 
instrument. In the market place for stocks, the opinions of these two groups of people continually 
clash, interact and modify one another until a price level for a stock is reached whereat here are 
about as many shares being bid for as being offered. What the investing public is trying to do is 
to decide on a price for a stock that adequately reflects the risks involved in securing a good return 
on the investment. With each passing moment, the risks are evaluated and reevaluated in the light 
of any new information that arises, and the market price of each stock fluctuates with each 
revelation. The thoughts of the investing public concerning the prospects of the many businesses 
upon which our society relies are mirrored in the market quotations on the financial pages of the 
daily newspapers. These prices represent the collective wisdom of millions of buy, sell, don't buy 
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and don't sell decisions. Each of these numbers takes into account all possible futures and their 
related probabilities, as seen by the investing public. 
Like other free markets, the stock exchanges set and enforce the rules of investing. They place 
no restrictions on who may play, they do not interfere with investment strategies, they do not try 
to reallocate profits and losses, and they do not influence stock prices. Finally, they encourage the 
fullest dissemination of financial information. 
SYMMETRY IN THE STOCK MARKET 
The calculation of an investor's expectation i the stock market is more difficult han in the simple 
games of chance considered above because investment outcomes are contingent on the length of 
time stocks are held. Holding times must be standardized in order to compare the returns from 
stocks owned for varying time intervals. For this purpose, the compound interest formula serves 
(see Appendix C). We shall reduce the profit and loss on all stock transactions to a percentage rate 
of return compounded yearly (denoted by r in what follows) as given by 
A =P( l+r ) " ,  
where P is the initial amount invested and A is what the investment is worth n years afterward. 
An investor's expectation is then the average of the percentage rates of return over a large number 
of investments. 
Initially, we shall determine an i vestor's expectation when buying stocks at random. That is, 
stocks will be selected blindly with no regard to a corporation's past performance, future prospects, 
economic onditions or any other information. In other words, we assume interchange symmetry 
holds and no one investor is superior to any other in selecting stocks for profit. Once this is done, 
claims of better performance will be analyzed for possible symmetry violations. 
We proceed as follows: (1) pick a stock at random; (2) pick a purchase data at random and note 
the price; (3) pick a later sales date at random and note the price; (4) using the compound interest 
formula, compute the interest rate r; (5) repeat he same procedure over and over again; (6) average 
the r s to obtain the expectation. 
Carrying out this procedure for all stocks and all time periods over stock market history would 
be an endless task. However, a good random sampling of the total stock population has been 
published using 1715 stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange during the interval from 
January 1926 through November 1960 [5]. The results are shown in Fig. 2. For the 1715 stocks, 
56,557,538 holding periods, varying from one month to the full 35 years covered by the study, went 
into the graph. The expectation calculated from the data is + 9% per year compounded annually. 
An extension of the research to 1976 revealed no significant alterations of the results [6]. 
These measurements of the returns on common stocks suggest he possible outcomes available 
to an investor who bought blindly at any time between 1926 and 1976. Most likely, he would have 
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Fig. 2. Distribution ofreturns from random investments in tocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(1926-1960). 
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Sometimes, much higher yields would have been obtained--some made fortunes--and sometimes 
much lower, even to a complete loss of capital. The worst losses took place during the Great 
Depression; almost a 50% loss was taken by the average investor for stocks owned outright if he 
bought in September 1929 and sold late in 1932. However, overall, the rates of return on common 
stocks far exceeded those of any other investment instrument. 
The distribution of returns is near normal, which is what we expect if every investor has the same 
expectation. A deviation from the normal distribution occurs in the right shoulder of the curve. 
There are too many returns between 12 and 50%. This skewness is reminiscent of the pari mutuel 
market, where late-breaking information seemed to be the cause. 
Let us examine the claims of the experts with regard to better than random performance. One 
hint comes from an item in The New York Times, 16 August 1967: 
"A member of the Senate Banking Committee sought to prove today that it is possible to pick a portfolio 
of stocks that would do better than most mutual funds imply by throwing darts at the New York Stock 
Exchange list. Senator Thomas J. Mclntyre, Democrat ofNew Hampshire, reported tothe committee that 
he had done just that, and gotten better investment results than the average of even the most growth- 
oriented mutual funds. A hypothetical $10,000 investment made I0 years ago in the senator's dart-selected 
stocks would be worth $25,300 now." 
A mutual fund is an organization that collects money from people and invests it for the purpose 
of capital growth from appreciation and dividends. The fund managers spend full time investigating 
and analyzing investment opportunities and so, presumably, should be able to do better than 
average. The senator told the committee that he tried the experiment after fund managers disputed 
testimony by Paul Samuelson, Nobel Laureate in economics, that random stock selection yields 
investment results as good or better than those achieved by the funds. 
Expert performance is exposed more definitively in the following summary covering the years 
from 1927 to 1960 [7]: 
1927-1935 
"It can, then, be concluded with considerable assurance that the entire group of management investment 
companies proper (as opposed to the sample here studied) failed to perform better than an index of 
leading common stocks and probably performed somewhat worse than the index .... " 
1934-1939 
The overall gain in asset value of the six largest companies averaged out to 53.7% including 
dividends paid out. Standard & Poor's 420 stock index showed a 66.6% increase and only one of 
the funds exceeded this figure by achieving 70.6%. 
1940-1949 
The same six companies had an average gain of 129% compared to 97% for the Standard & Poor 
index. 
1951-1960 
The performance of 58 companies over this ten-year period averaged to a gain of 221%, more 
than tripling the initial capital. But Standard & Poor's Composite Index of 500 stocks rose 322%, 
almost 50% better than the average of the funds. This figure was exceeded by only three of the funds. 
Quoting Graham, Dodd and Cottle: 
"These results do not appear to us to be as satisfactory as they should be. They suggest that he investment 
companies a a whole---and practicing security analysts as a whole- -might  well examine their basic 
approaches to both the selections ofcommon stocks for purchase and the decision to sell 'less atisfactory' 
holdings." 
Matters have not improved since. From 1958 to 1967, the average return per annum compounded 
annually for 146 funds was 10%, the same as  for each of the Dow-Jones averages of industrial, rail 
and utility stocks. In the l0 years ending 31 March 1976, the net asset value of the average mutual 
fund was up 46%, far behind the 60% gain in the Dow-Jones industrial average. [4]. 
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From U.S. News and Worm Report, 31 August 1987: 
"The blue-chip bull has created an ironic twist: Over the past five years, the average quity fund- -a  mutual  
fund that invests in a broad selection of s tocks - -hasn ' t  bettered or even kept pace with either the soaring 
Dow- Jones  Industr ia l  Average or the Standard & Poor 's  500 Index. You  might  have done better investing 
in an index fund . . . .  " 
An index fund invests in stocks found in an index, usually the Standard & Poor's 500, so that its 
portfolio mirrors the index. 
Further evidence comes from years of testing of the random walk model of the stock market [8]. 
Price changes in stocks satisfy random walk criteria and are, presumptively, a series of random 
numbers. If such be the case, there is no way of predicting price changes and conservation of 
information exists for the stock market. Evidence to the contrary islacking, a very unusual situation 
in economics. 
SYMMETRY VIOLATION IN THE STOCK MARKET 
The analysis of the preceding section points to a symmetric stock market, one in which every 
investor has the same expectation. The skewness in the distribution of returns from common stock 
investments, however, suggests the possibility of a quasi-symmetric stock market similar in nature 
to the pari mutuel market. Does the stock market adjust instantaneously to late-breaking informa- 
tion or is such information discounted over time? If the discounting process is of sufficient duration, 
can astute investors acting on the late-breaking information perform better than average? 
The effect of late-breaking information is analyzed most thoroughly in "The Science of Winning" 
[4]. There it is shown that the investing public's response to surprising quarterly earnings reports 
----earnings widely divergent from estimates by financial analysts--is not by any means reflected 
instantaneously in stock prices, but is a process that may go on for months. During this period of 
adjustment, there are opportunities for better-than-average performance. 
The response to quarterly earnings reports was tested as follows: 
(1) Quarterly earnings projections for some 1500 stocks were obtained from investment services 
and brokerage houses. For each company, the highest estimate was compared with the actual 
earnings reported by the corporation in its quarterly report in the Wall Street Journal. The 
percentage change from the estimate was calculated. Companies were then separated into six 
categories: (i) those showing better-than-expected earnings of 20% or more; (ii) those with better- 
than-expected arnings between l0 and 19%; (iii) 0-9%; (iv) those showing worse-than-expected 
earnings of 1-9%; (v) 10-19% and (vi) 20% or more worse than expected. 
(2) The price of each stock was recorded as of the opening of the stock market on the second 
business day following the announcement of quarterly earnings and again, approx. 3 months later, 
at the opening of the stock market on the second business day following the succeeding earnings 
announcement. For each stock, the percentage change in price over the time interval between 
earnings reports was calculated. 
Tables 3 and 4 display the results for two different time intervals. The "expectation" row gives 
the range of results to be expected if a person blindly picks a sample of this group size from the 
total sample and observes the number doing better than average. 
Clearly, there is a symmetry violation on the basis of late-breaking information on earnings 
reports. Those stocks with better-than-expected earnings not only perform better than the others, 
but they do so on a statistically significant scale. Further statistical tests are applied in Ref. [4] and 
point to the same conclusion. 
Table 3. Price performance of stocks by group, 1 August 1969-1 September 1971 
Group I II III IV V VI Total 
Number of stocks 981 732 1907 1440 960 2260 8280 
Mean price change + 5.9% + 2.9% + 1.4% - 0.2% - 1.2% - 2.5% + 0.4% 
Number of stocks performing 605 484 1157 829 536 945 4556 
better than the market (62%) (66%) (61%) (58%) (56%) (42%) (55%) 
Number of stocks performing 376 248 750 611 424 1315 3724 
equal to or worse than (38%) (34%) (39%) (42%) (44%) (58%) (45%) 
the market 
Expectation 540 _+ 28 403 ± 24 1049 _+ 36 792 _+ 34 528 _+ 30 1243 _+ 40 
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Table 4. Price performance of stocks by group, 1 September 1971-15 May 1973 
Group I II III IV V Vl Total 
Number of stocks 1193 683 2158 1682 1161 2524 9401 
Mean price change + 3.7% + 2.4% + 0.6% - 1.4% - 2.3% - 3.5% - 0.7% 
Number of stocks performing 680 394 1189 842 551 1001 4657 
better than the market (57%) (58%) (55%) (50%) (47%) (40%) (50%) 
Number of stocks performing 513 289 969 840 610 1523 4744 
equal to or worse than (43%) (42%) (45%) (50%) (53%) (60%) (50%) 
the market 
Expectation 597 ± 32 342 ± 26 1079 ± 40 841 ± 36 581 ± 32 1262 ± 44 
On the basis of historical information, the stock market, like the pari mutuel market, is symmetric 
and there is conservation of information. Late-breaking information causes a symmetry violation 
and permits ome investors to perform better than average. We have another example of a market 
in which each investor uses all available information to pursue his own best interests and, by so 
doing, creates a market with a high expectation for all. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
we must conclude that this free-market expectation is the best possible at present. 
SYMMETRY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 
We turn now from money markets to consume'r'niarkets. In so doing,'we face a new and difficult 
challenge in evaluating the expectation. What is the value of goods and services received for each 
dollar spent? In money markets, the expectation is simply calculated by dividing the net profit or 
loss by the amount risked. To make such a calculation in consumer markets, however, we must 
assign monetary values to the sensual and psychological utility generated by the purchase of goods 
ond services. Needless to say, there exists no generally accepted model of human behavior that 
permits uch a calculation, and obtaining the expectation i this manner can lead only to ambiguity 
and controversy. In lieu of the expectation, therefore, we shall focus on conservation of information 
to demonstrate symmetry in free consummer markets. 
To start, let us look at a typical market, that of automobiles in America. There are many 
manufacturers, both foreign and domestic offering a wide variety of makes and models in all price 
ranges. In order to stay in business, an automaker must compete with all the others for the consumer's 
dollar. The risks are enormous, the constraints tight. A fickle public demands cars possessing 
quality, style and extra features. Dealer networks for sales and service are mandatory. Research and 
development to keep abreast of product and manufacturing innovations are essential lest the 
competition or some market newcomer introduce a superior automobile and gain market share. 
All these activities require a huge money inflow from car sales, not only to cover operating costs 
but to reap an adequate return on the invested capital (or else, why not liquidate and invest the 
money elsewhere?). To reach the necessary sales level, our automaker must negotiate a fair price 
for his cars with the consumer. That is vitally important. Should his prices be too high, he may sell 
too few cars and lose money. Should they be too low, he may sell more cars and still lose money. 
Usually, there is an optimal price leading to optimal sales and profits. The optimal price does, of 
course, vary with economic onditions. Since nobody can accurately predict what these might be 
like months hence, our manufacturer must continually adjust prices on the basis of current sales 
figures. Such adjustments may take the form of sales incentives uch as rebates and low-interest 
loans. During recessions, the optimal price may even lead to an operating loss. 
On the other side of the equation, Mr Average Consumer is faced with choosing a car from a 
bewildering array of makes and models. He may decide on anything from a high-priced luxury item 
like a Rolls Royce to a low-priced utilitarian Volkswagen Golf. Expensive cars offer more in quality, 
style and social status, but even the inexpensive models perform well their basic function of getting 
people from one place to another. 
This brief introduction to a consumer market brings us to a consideration of its state of knowledge. 
Firstly, with regard to the producers, we ask: does every successful automobile manufacturer possess 
all the information ecessary to secure his niche in the car market? If the answer is yes, then we have 
conservation of information. That is, no one producer knows anything that enables him to drive 
his competition out of existence and keep out newcomers. Certainly, there will be times when one 
manufacturer gets a momentary edge by inventing a new and advanced component, or by develop- 
Symmetry  in flee markets  665 
ing lower cost manufacturing techniques, or by a new styling, or by some innovation anywhere 
along the intricate chain of producing and selling an automobile. When something like that 
happens, the rest of the market must and usually does adjust in the direction of greater efficiency. 
The Japanese automakers, for example, broke into the world market with new and lower cost cars 
and now compete very successfully with the established producers. At other times, companies die 
because they are unable to adapt to changed conditions. Studebaker and American Motors, among 
many others, have passed from the scene. Sometimes, markets expand and allow increased market 
share for newly born and mature producers. And sometimes markets contract driving even some 
of the most efficient producers into extinction. These are market fluctuations that may arise 
anywhere and anytime because of changes in technical, economic and political conditions. But, 
unless one producer gobbles up market share to the point of extinguishing his rivals, we have to 
conclude that information isconserved. The constancy of market share among the major producers 
over the years argues strongly for this view. 
Conservation of information implies equality of expectation for all producers. We can measure 
the expectation i the same way as for the financial markets: divide the net profit or loss by the 
amount risked and average over some convenient time period. For businesses, the figure of interest 
is the per cent return on net worth. It is calculated by dividing the company's net earnings by the 
company's net assets (the value of what it owns less any liabilities). This is the number that tells 
us how much money a company makes or loses on its investment, how successful or unsuccessful 
it is. In a similar manner, the bank interest rate on savings tells a depositor how much he profits 
from his deposit. Table 5 shows the per cent return on net worth for seven automobile manufacturers 
for each year during the ten year period 1978-1987. Negative returns arise when a company loses 
money for the year. 
The returns on net worth vary considerably, just as we should now expect for any risk venture. 
Each company's fortunes ebb and flow on management decisions concerning production levels, 
model and style changes, quality control, debt load and advertising budgets. All companies are 
hostage to the political and economic uncertainties that obscure the consumer's purchasing power. 
The three American companies, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler, suffered considerably in the 
early 1980's from Japanese competition and a strong dollar. Chrysler would have gone bankrupt 
except for a government loan bailout. Nowadays, Chrysler and Ford have come back strongly while 
General Motors languishes with an inadequate return on investment and the foreign manufacturers 
suffer from a weak dollar. 
By averaging the returns on investment, we obtain a reasonable value for the expectation of 
an automobile manufacturer. Omitting the years 1980-1982 for Chrysler, which are distorted by 
government intervention, the expectation is 16.9%. Given the statistical smallness of the sample, 
the returns on investment are not inconsistent with an equal expectation for all manufactures. 
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we conclude that interchange symmetry exists for 
manufacturers in free markets. 
Interchange symmetry applies only to the expectation. Just as people in the roulette market differ 
in an infinity of ways other than their expectation, manufacturers differ in the products offered, 
management and production techniques and many other ways. However, all look the same to the 
car market in terms of expectation. 
A 16.9% return is a good deal higher than those available from savings instruments such as 
government bonds, and apparently furnishes an adequate reward to business owners for business 
risks and headaches. It also seems low enough to keep newcomers out of the market. Such an 
Table 5. Percent return on net worth for automobile manufacturers, 1978-1987 
1987 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 (estimated) 
Chrysler -8.3 -71.4 -561.2 -97.3 -31.0 38.5 45.3 38.8 26.3 21.0 
Jaguar . . . .  41.9 4.6 67.6 27.1 67.0 24.8 25.0 
Ford 16.4 11.2 -18.1 -14.4 --10.8 24.7 29.6 20.5 22.1 28.0 
General Motors 20.2 15.2 -4 .5  1.9 5.3 18.0 18.8 13.6 9.7 8.0 
Honda 7.6 12.3 27.5 17.2 15.0 16.7 17.7 19.2 11.1 10.0 
Subaru 42.4 39.9 41.7 39.4 38.5 33.8 30.1 28.9 29.8 - 15.0 
Volvo 9.4 13.0 7.3 11.2 7.3 15.2 23.3 21.0 13.8 13.5 
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Table  6. Percent return on  net wor th  for petroleum companies, 1978-1987 
1987 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 (estimated) 
Atlantic Richfield 14.6 19.1 22.2 19.3 16.6 14.5 14.1 27.0 11.7 19.5 
Amoco 15.1 18.0 20.4 18.0 16.5 15.4 17.0 16.9 8.2 10.5 
British Petroleum 11.8 32.5 24.2 13.9 8+3 9.0 12.1 16.1 8.2 13.5 
Chevron 13.4 19.2 21.7 18.7 10.4 12.5 11.5 9.3 5.8 6.0 
Exxon 13.7 19.1 22.2 19.5 14.6 16.9 19.2 18.6 15.6 13.5 
Mobil 12.6 19.1 21.5 16.6 9.4 10.8 10.1 11.4 9.6 8.5 
Royal Dutch 13.6 29.3 18.5 13.6 11.8 14.l 14.3 14.4 10.2 10.5 
Texaco 9.0 16.5 17.9 16.8 10.0 8.4 7.6 8.2 4.4 4.0 
expectation furnishes bountiful rewards to Mr Average Consumer, who revels in the quantity, 
richness, variety and affordability of automobiles offered for sale. Again, the market appears 
efficient, with both producer and consumer deriving a maximum of utility from their transactions. 
Table 6 exhibits the percentage returns on investment for some of the larger companies in the 
petroleum industry. The products old in this market are not as subject o consumer vagaries as 
automobiles and the returns on investment do not vary as much. The expectation is 14.6%. And 
again, the returns for all companies over the years are consistent with the same expectation for all. 
The expectation i a free market is self-regulated. Too high an expectation i vites competition 
from newcomers and old competitors anxious to share in the high profits. Too low an expectation 
stimulates corrective action, which can take many forms: liquidating the business, buying new 
businesses with better expectations, installation of new officers, takeovers by others who think they 
can utilize the company's resources to get a better eturn on investment. Too low an expectation 
in a whole industry may also be a symptom of serious illness. It may arise from many sources, such 
as high labor costs, high taxes, government control of prices or excessive government regulation. 
Whatever the reason, low profits impede the replacement of aging equipment and reduce the levels 
of research and development spending. The ensuing deterioration of the industry may induce 
newcomers, both foreign and domestic, to seize the opportunity to establish themselves. In general, 
it appears that free market expectations are set with due regard for both the long-term and 
short-term health of the industry. 
What about symmetry on the consumer's side? Mr Average Consumer must weigh the advantages 
and disadvantages of the cars offered for sale and decide on what is best for him. The question is 
this: does every consumer have the same expectation as all others? Or, equivalently, does the buyer 
get what he pays for? 
Just as in all other free markets, the consumer has at his disposal a vast amount of information. 
There are the advertising claims put out by the various manufacturers, the results of road tests by 
various testing organizations, and word-of-mouth evaluations by relatives, friends and neighbors. 
Finally, our consumer can test-drive the car himself to see if it suits him. There would appear to 
be no information available to one consumer and not to another that enables him to say one car 
is a better buy than another. Subjective differences of opinion always arise. However, for every 
person saying car A offers better value dollar for dollar than car B, somebody else can be found 
who says the opposite. Again, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we assign to all consumers 
the same expectation. 
It should be evident hat the expectation i a consumer market may vary with changing economic 
conditions. A sluggish car or petroleum market, for example, may result in a buyer's market hat 
enhances the consumer's expectation through lower prices. Only an equal expectation for all exists 
at any given time. This does not mean each and every consumer gets the same return per dollar 
spent. Some people may pick up bargains and others may overpay. Many random factors can enter 
into the final price determination, and the expectation is only the central value of all these 
possibilities. As with the other free markets we have considered, this expectation appears to be the 
best possible. 
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN SYMMETRIC MARKETS 
We assume that all governments have as one of their primary goals the enhancement of each and 
every citizen's economic expectation. To achieve such an end, a government must establish the 
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conditions necessary for expanding a nation's production of goods and services to the maximum 
possible xtent. And it must foster an equitable distribution of those necessities and niceties of life 
consistent with the highest standard of living for all. These are noble intentions. They usually are. 
However, fulfilling noble intentions in the real world is fraught with difficulty and danger. Reality 
is never as simple-minded as so many people make it out to be. Economic, sociological and 
psychological models of reality designed to cope with the real world are woefully inadequate and 
cannot reliably predict he future consequences of present actions. All too often, "the road to hell 
is paved with good intentions". With little scientific knowledge to go on, nations can choose their 
paths to economic greatness guided only by their philosophies of government. Of these, the two 
most important are those of Adam Smith ("the least government is the best government") and Karl 
Marx ("centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State"). We shall briefly 
summarize the arguments ofthese diametrically opposed views and assess them from the standpoint 
of market symmetry. 
Adam Smith's "invisible hand" is the basis of capitalism. This principle may be stated as follows: 
the greatest prosperity for all comes about, as if guided by an invisible hand, when and where each 
and every individual has a maximum of freedom to decide upon and pursue his own best interests. 
Many implications follow, both economic and political. Here we have the premise that the collective 
wisdom of all the people, which is brought into focus by the marketplace and the voting booth, can 
handle the massive problems besetting all of us more ably than any king, dictator or ruling elite. 
Here we have the notion that a surging sea of random decisions by countless millions of people 
generates the fads and fashions of the times, the great discoveries and inventions, the finest art, 
the most abundant production and the most widespread and equitable distribution of goods and 
services. Here we have the thought that profit motivates people to act far more often for the better- 
ment of mankind than to its detriment. On the political side, it becomes the function of government 
to maximize the freedom of all its citizens. Adam Smith's very sophisticated i ea appears to be 
rooted in what is known in physics and mathematics a the random walk. Instead of random steps 
leading to a normally distributed random variable, there are random decisions leading to a normal 
distribution of possible prosperities, with maximum prosperity most likely. In this century, the 
random walk has been responsible for a deeper understanding of natural phenomena r nging from 
the behavior of the fundamental particles of the universe to practical human affairs. 
Marxism, on the other hand, promotes the idea that the production of goods and services under 
capitalism can never be sufficiently arge to reward the proletariat for its labor. Maximum produc- 
tion can be achieved only by taking the means of production out of private hands and placing them 
under State control. Marx apparently did not subscribe to the notion, so in vogue today, that a 
Robin Hood type redistribution of wealth from rich to poor in itself could materially benefit he 
poor. His goal, a bountiful and equal slice of the pie for each and every individual, was predicated 
on much larger production. Politically, there is much for government to do. It must take over 
private property and nationalize industry. It must hire people to run the means of production and 
distribution and plan the nation's economic future. It must control wages and prices and direct he 
course of research and development. Under Marx's philosophy, public servants assume a role akin 
to Plato's philosopher-king. 
Looking at these two philosophies in terms of market symmetry, there is a striking difference in 
their treatment of information. We have presented cogent evidence that free markets are symmetric 
to a high degree. The people participating in these markets, whether as producers or consumers, 
strive to do the best they can for themselves and, in so doing, utilize all available information to 
make the market as efficient as possible. Conservation of information thereby becomes a feature 
of the marketplace. At the same time, symmetry violations can take place. When they do, the 
marketplace affords ample opportunity and reward for those rare individuals who are able to 
perceive and correct market inefficiencies. These are unpredictable achievements by gifted people 
fortunate to be in the right place at the right time. Inventions or new ways of doing things or new 
systems of thought hat reveal the future more clearly than before mark their appearance. Often, 
these innovations spark a vigorous exploitation of ideas and resources that enhances a nation's 
quality of life through the introduction of new and improved products and services. 
In contrast, Marxism is an asymmetric, elitist philosophy. All information is vested, not in the 
people, but in the State, which means in those people running the country, the Communist Party. 
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It is their job to determine what should be produced, how much, by whom and for whom. No 
competition from private sources is tolerated. Party rulers are responsible for originating and 
promoting new products and services and improving the quality of life. Their decisions are final. 
The people as a whole are excluded and have little input. 
The rationale behind government intervention i to free markets is the possession by public 
servants of information superior to that possessed by the marketplace. Such exclusive information 
presumably qualifies them to try their hand at improving free market efficiency. They may, for 
example, fix the size of businesses through anti-trust policies, regulate wages and prices, hand out 
subsidies to troubled industries, control the money supply through central banking activities, back 
projects they deem worthy, and redistribute income through progressive tax policies. 
However, what if free markets are indeed symmetric? What can public servants hope to add to 
the store of knowledge if all valid information is utilized? Their "exclusive" information is then 
nothing more than noble intentions. They are merely processing notoriously untested and unreliable 
social and economic data in reality models that have trouble predicting tomorrow's date. The effect 
on market efficiency is more apt to be harmful, even destructive, than beneficial. Recall the inferior 
performance of the experts associated with the pari mutuel and stock markets. These markets are 
inherently much simpler than national economic systems and, one might think, more susceptible 
to expert management. Yet, the public as a whole, with each person pursuing his own best interests 
in the tradition of Adam Smith's invisible hand, consistently outperforms the experts. 
In symmetric markets, it would appear, the role of government should be sharply delimited. 
Maximizing the freedom of its citizens, maintaining law and order, protecting the nation from 
internal and external tyranny, negotiating trade treaties with foreign powers, establishing a system 
of weights and measures--these ar functions that should provide benefits to free markets over and 
above the costs of government. Any other government intrusions into free markets hould be taken 
with extreme caution. 
Again, evidence to the contrary is lacking. The greatest Western powers, Rome, Great Britain 
and the United States of America, all became great when their governments played an insignificant 
role in business affairs. A comparison of government spending relative to private and business 
spending illustrates this point very clearly. When government grew to sizable proportions, both the 
Roman and British Empires entered into protracted declines. And, even in America, the growth of 
government has slowed economic expansion to a crawl. Finally, it may be noted that those countries 
starting out with massive government interference in the marketplace never achieve a standard of 
living for their citizens on a par with free market societies. 
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APPENDIX  A 
Expectation in the Roulette Market 
The concept of average performance is defined concisely by the expectation, which is given by a formula from probability 
theory: 
E = Ptol + P2o2 + • • ., 
E is the expectation, the Ps are the probabilities of all possible outcomes, and the os are the rewards attached to each 
outcome. Using this formula to calculate the expectation of "red" bets in roulette, we have 
E = 18/38 ($1) + 20/38 ( -$1)  = --$2/38. 
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APPENDIX  B 
Expectation in the Pari Mutuel Market 
The expectation of a horse bettor, using the formula from Appendix A, is 
E,= P,o, +(1 - P i ) ( -$1) ,  
E~ is the expectation of a gambler betting on horse i, Pi the true (and unknown) probability of winning for horse i, o~ the 
reward if it wins, (1 - P~) the probability that horse i loses, and $1 the stake. The term o~ is identical with the odds to a dollar 
against horse i winning the race, or the dollar odds, for short. For example, if horse i is at odds of two to one (2/1), its winning 
will net its backers a profit of two dollars for every dollar bet. In terms of money bet, 
M -- m i - - fM  
0 i 
mi  
where M is the total amount of money wagered on all the horses in the race, rn~ the money wagered on horse i, f the  "take", 
andfM the total deducted from the win pool for the track and state. The numerator is the money in the win pool available 
to be paid out as a profit to the people who bet on horse i. 
The odds may be related to the probability of winning pi as assigned by the public to horse i using 
mi 
Pi ~ - - .  
M 
This is just the fraction of money in the win pool bet on horse i. Combining the three formulas in this appendix, we get the 
expectation for bettors on horse i, 
E~ = P~(I - f )  - 1. 
Pi 
APPENDIX  C 
Expectation in the Stock Market 
Expectation i  the stock market is given by the yearly rate of interest compounded yearly based on the initial investment. 
Thus, P dollars invested for n years at an interest rate of r% compounded yearly will amount o A dollars as given by the 
compound interest formula, 
A = P(! + r~. 
As an illustration, suppose we buy 100 shares of General Motors stock at $55 per share and sell it I year later for $60 per 
share. What is our return per dollar invested? The original investment is $5600 ($5500 for the stock plus $I00 commission). 
On the sale of the stock 1 year later, we receive $6000 less $I00 in commissions plus $380 in dividends paid by the company, 
or a net of $6280. Substituting in the formula, 
6280 = 5600 (1 + r) ~ 
and r = 0.12 or 12%. Every dollar invested in General Motors was worth $1.12 I year later. Averaging the rs for all 
transactions then gives the expectation. 
